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       ABSTRACT 
 
The examination of power equilibrium of two parties that bring their dispute 
before a mediator reveals the complex issues that may arise during mediation which 
can jeopardize fundamental rights of the weak party and end up in the failure of the 
process. In this regard it is worth studying whether principles of law established to 
serve the adversary system explicitly or implicitly apply in mediation, in order to 
provide the mediator with the legal grounds for the protection of the weak party and the 
exercise of his/her civil rights. On the same reasoning, the impact of arbitration 
principles as the primary alternative dispute resolution method and the degree of their 
influence in mediation is also worth studying. Power imbalances produce numerous 
ethical dilemmas for a mediator and challenge the core values that govern his role. 
Therefore, the investigation of available remedies or more preferably the strategy a 
mediator may follow is of extreme importance. At this paper we will specifically focus 
on power imbalance issues that derive from private relations, namely civil, commercial 
and family cases, mainly within the Greek and European legal environment.  
 
             Thessaloniki, November 28, 2013 
         Vassiliki P. Pantelidou 
     Lawyer at the Bar Association of Thessaloniki 
     Accredited Mediator of the Hellenic Ministry 
                 of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights 
            and the  
        Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (CIArb) 
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I.- INTRODUCTION  
 Throughout the social and political history of human kind we find differences 
that distinguish among people and classify them in categories. Except for the natural 
characteristics acquired by birth, such as handicapped or mentally defective persons, 
most differences are constructions of the human mind based on characteristics such as 
clan, ethnicity, nation, race, social class, religious sect etc1. These differences have their 
roots in all modern societies and primarily take the form of three types of inequity: 
power, wealth and knowledge, distinguishing individuals in the ones who own the 
desired resources and the ones who do not, categorizing them in strong and weak 
individuals or social groups accordingly. Throughout social and political struggles 
people have always fought not only for the acquisition of fundamental rights but also 
for enjoying equality among them and before law, and furthermore for enjoying fair and 
just allocation of goods and services. Justice has been established as the primary 
institution for regulating conflict of power in private individual interrelations, as well as 
in administrative relations, i.e. between people and a state. It has the authority to reverse 
power imbalance and adjust different interests and needs.  
To accomplish equality, a state provides every citizen, irrespectively of his   
gender, age, social status, economic capacity or religious believes, with the right to seek 
recourse to justice and assert the satisfaction of his/her interests. In practice, this 
possibility is granted through binding laws, principles and ethical standards imposing a 
firm legal framework, the implementation of which helps judges impose the equal 
exercise of civil or other rights of both disputants, acknowledge the rights of the weak, 
and respectively restrain the chaotic results of the “rule of the strong”. Law primarily 
aims at redressing power imbalance among citizens which dictates and results in the 
prevalence of one’s status, will or needs upon others. It derives from the very core 
instincts of every living creature on earth, whether in human, animal or natural 
environment, and exists in all levels of coexistence. It emerges in all kinds of individual 
interrelations in everyday life of a contemporary state, no matter how civilized and 
profoundly organized a country might be.  
 
  
                                                
1  Dugan A. Marie, “Power Inequities”, Beyond Intractability, Conflict Information Consortium, 
University of Colorado 2003-2012, p. 3 
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II.- EQUALITY BEFORE LAW 
 A state’s fundamental individual and social rights are established in its 
Constitution2 and international Treaties3 it has signed or acceded to, which outline the 
basic norms of a state’s structure and public policy and at the same time reflect the 
historical background and national mentality. In a democratic state, the separation of 
powers between the legislative order, the executive order and justice, aims at founding 
transparent procedures for the implementation of laws and the enforcement of the 
decisions of a governmental majority, in order to secure free enactment of civil rights, 
freedom of expression and equality among citizens on solid grounds. States regulate 
their functioning by establishing and implementing laws. Law has two basic and 
intimately connected tasks: to solve conflicts and to foster conformity to legal rules4. On 
these grounds we wonder: Is there real equality among citizens before law? What are 
the mechanisms a state uses to guarantee it?  
 
III.- JUSTICE 
Expecting a citizen to assume responsibility for acting in a morally appropriate 
and even-handed way is at least frivolous and visionary. Justice is the state’s normative 
tool which operates through laws and principles of the Procedural Codes, and provides 
prescriptive assertions of the principle of equality, in order to guarantee the exercise of 
fundamental rights for all its citizens. The existence of natural, social and economic 
power inequities between people demands the state’s drastic intervention to restrain, if 
not eliminate, the phenomenon of inequality and provide its citizens with the possibility 
of peaceful coexistence, personal and transactional relations, prosperity and growth. 
Equal treatment by law and equality before law are the preconditions for inducing the 
improvement of a citizen’s life and give him the possibility to invent creative options to 
profit in individual and social level.  
                                                
2 Greek Constitution 1975/1986/2001/2008 Articles: 1 (Equality before law), 8 (Right to natural judge),  
   20 (Right to legal protection) etc. 
3 For example: Charter of Fundamental Rights of  the European Union (2010/C 83/02) Articles: 1   
   (Human Dignity), 2  (Right to life), 6 (Right to liberty and security) etc.;  
  European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols No  
  11&14, Articles: 2 (Right to life), 6 (Right to a fair trial) etc.  
4 Vilhelm Aubert, “Courts and Conflict Resolution”, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 11, No 1, 
   Law and Conflict Resolution (Mar., 1967), p. 1 
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Inequality of power often exists among conflicting parties. In this regard, the 
prevalence of the “rule of the strong” is deemed to be officially unacceptable for a well 
governed state and legally inadmissible for justice.  
 
IV.- PROCEDURAL PRINCIPLES 
General principles as a source of law govern both Procedural Codes and 
substantive law to eliminate physical, social and economic inequities, and attempt to at 
least provide a “technical” equality among disputants. Party self-determination, equality 
of rights and obligations as well as the right to a fair hearing, the publicity of the 
sessions, the obligation of the litigants to participate in litigation in good faith and 
honesty, are some of the basic principles, acknowledged universally, that govern the 
procedure of the adversary system and underlie in detail the norms for disputing parties’ 
access to courts5. 
Equality as a constitutional right is also served by the ideal of being tried before 
a legally appointed court of law, consisted by professional experts, trained to guarantee 
equal treatment and procedural fairness of all the parties involved in a dispute, 
understand the core issues of a case and conduct thorough investigations of the material 
facts to estimate the liability of the defendant. This is an indefeasible right for every 
class of people no matter whether they are privileged or not. No one can be deprived of 
this right, nor can a judge decline his office. It is the right of access to the “natural 
judge”6, i.e. the natural person who is nominated as a judge or a court of law which has 
jurisdiction to rule a case. A judges’ duty is to resolve the disputes that one of the 
litigants brings before him asking for a final decision on the case, namely the 
enforcement of the judicial decree against the defendant. Impartiality, objectivity and 
neutrality, as well as judge’s knowledge and legal expertise are the basic reasons why 
parties usually waive their capacity of attempting to reach a resolution by themselves 
and entrust an unknown third party to intervene in the conflict.  
A judge exerts his power by interpreting and implementing the law within the 
limits that general principles of law, Procedural Rules, substantive law and case-law 
indicate. He renders his principled and reasoned decision based on legal norms. 
Although a dispute resolved finally is presumed to be fair and equitable for both parties, 
                                                
5 According to the Greek	  Code	  of	  Civil	  Procedure,	  these	  principles	  can	  be	  found	  accordingly	  in	  	  	  	  	  Articles	  106,	  110,	  113	  and	  116.	   
6 See supra note 5, Article 109 
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infringements of substantive or procedural rights provide the unsatisfied party with the 
legal ground to review the decision before a higher court. Additionally, violation of the 
standard of fairness, or unequal participation in the trial both in jurisdictions of common 
and continental law, provides a legal basis for bringing the case before the highest court 
of a country.  
Despite the objectives of Procedural Principles, equality of arms and equality 
before law are often violated in practice because of excessive use of available legal 
delays and remedies for the challenge of the enforceability of a court decision, made, in 
most cases, by malevolent debtors who do not want to abide by the award, but would 
rather spend money on long-lasting litigation to avoid the satisfaction of the winning 
party. Therefore equality of parties before law is often overturned on legal grounds by 
the same Procedural Rules that are established to guarantee it, as the winner of litigation 
remains unsatisfied for a very long time after the trial. Thus, the strong or weak position 
of the parties may, in practice, be changed depending on the circumstances of a 
particular case.  
 
V.- ARBITRATION  
By virtue of law the formal process of conventional adjudication can be replaced 
by arbitration, if the parties agree, in writing, to submit a future dispute of private nature 
in arbitration which derives from an already existing transactional relation between 
them. On the grounds of the arbitration agreement they may choose the mutually 
acceptable procedure to appoint the arbitral tribunal, the definition of a certain time 
limit for the initiation of the process, the applicable substantive law, the language in 
which the arbitration will be conducted, the seat of arbitration etc. Here the parties are 
practically withdrawing voluntarily from their legal right of access to the “natural” 
judge, to choose, by subjective criteria, and on the basis of his/their expertise in the 
subject matter of the case, the individual(s) who will constitute the arbitral tribunal. The 
constitutionality of this institution lies on the parties’ free and un-coerced decision to 
submit their dispute to arbitration7. To serve justice the arbitrator(s) must be neutral and 
impartial, and shall adjudicate the case within the limits of certain principles and 
procedural norms to guarantee for the parties a fair hearing, a highly structured process, 
                                                
7 Καϊσης Γ. Αθανάσιος, «Ακύρωση διαιτητικών αποφάσεων», εκδόσεις Σάκκουλα 1989, β΄ έκδοση, σ. 32 
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and finally, render a substantially just and equitable award. The arbitral tribunal 
emanates its power on the arbitration agreement.   
Arbitration is based on equality of parties8 which is a public policy principle, 
from the application of which parties cannot abstain9. It means that none of them retains 
special rights or is relieved from being liable for complying with a procedural 
obligation. Another important aspect of this principle is the value of equality for a fair 
hearing10, which means that each disputant retains the right to participate in all the 
discussions of the case, of being heard, submitting and supporting his allegations, as 
well as counter-arguing, orally or in written, his opponent’s claims. Any infringement of 
this principle renders the arbitral award voidable11. An already appointed12 arbitral 
tribunal practically implements this value and satisfies fairness, when it summons 
timely both parties to submit, within a specific time limit13, their allegations and 
supportive documents and gives them time to be informed and counter argue the 
opponent’s allegations and means of proof. Arbitrator(s) should not use as basis of their 
reasoning of the award prior personal knowledge of the case, otherwise they violate the 
principle of a fair trial by depriving the other party of his right to appraise and 
eventually counter-argue evidence. Last but not least, hiring a legal expert to assist the 
tribunal with the legal issues of the dispute, due to lack of legal knowledge, does not 
infringe the aforementioned principles.   
Arbitration is based on parties’ self-determination who are entitled, by making a 
new agreement, to decide and formulate the applicable procedure (timetable, sequence, 
number and place of sessions, preliminary awards, disclosure of evidence, etc.)14, unless 
they confide this task to the tribunal15. In every case the tribunal has to apply the 
fundamental principles of equality as mentioned above16.   
                                                
8 See supra note 5, Article 886;  
  Greek Law on International Commercial Arbitration 2735/1999, Article 18 (ΦΕΚ A 167/1999) 
9 Κουσούλης Ν. Στέλιος Διαιτησία-Ερµηνεία κατ’άρθρο», εκδόσεις Σάκκουλα, 2004, σελίς 78 
10 See supra note 5, Article 886&2 
11 See supra note 5, Article 897 section 5;  
   Κεραµεύς/Κονδύλης/Νίκας «Ερµηνεία ΚΠολΔ» εκδόσεις Σάκκουλα 2000, τόµος ΙΙ, σ. 1686, σχόλιο 22 
12 Καϊσης Γ. Αθανάσιος, Απαλαγάκη Χαρ. «Ο 5ος Λόγος Ακύρωσης της Διαιτητικής Απόφασης (άρθρο  
    897 αρ. 5 ΚΠολΔ)», σελίς 5  
13 See supra note 12, p. 6-7 
14 See supra note 5, Article 886&1;  
    See supra note 7, p. 34  
    Φουστούκος Άγγελος «Η Διαιτητική Διαδικασία», Δ 1980, 222, 225-226  
15 Multiple First Instance Court of Athens 8257/82, ΕλλΔ 24 (1983), 550 
16 See supra note 12, p. 4   
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Furthermore arbitration is a primarily confidential process mainly due to its legal 
ground which is the agreement of the parties17. It is conducted between the signatories 
of the arbitration agreement or their authorized representatives. However confidentiality 
is practically violated, when one of the parties challenges the enforcement or the 
recognition of the arbitral award before civil courts where sessions are public18.  
 The choice of the parties to submit their dispute to arbitration reflects their belief 
in the legal and substantive basis of their arguments and proves their economic capacity 
to undertake the high costs of the process. Except for their competence to express freely 
their opinions and wishes, it also proves their sufficient capacity to negotiate 
effectively, to regulate for instance procedural matters. Primarily it indicates their will 
to comply voluntarily with the arbitral award, which is rendered final, if they decide to 
waive from the right to challenge it. Although these findings demonstrate that power 
imbalance issues do not normally emerge in arbitration, this may not be the case at the 
time the dispute arises, when things may have changed for one of the disputants due to 
financial, social, political or other external reasons, that have impacted on his economic 
capacity or on his efficiency to produce the goods or provide the services agreed.  
Despite the firm structure of the arbitration process, its main disadvantage, in 
relation to litigation before courts, is the reduced guarantees of judicial impartiality and 
neutrality19.  
 
VI.- MEDIATION  
Mediation is another alternative dispute resolution method to adjudication. It is a 
structured process by which, in its basic facilitative type20, an impartial third party, the 
mediator, administers a dispute and facilitates its resolution by helping disputants reach 
a mutually acceptable agreement. It has proved to be a successful process for resolving 
mostly civil, family and commercial disputes, and it has gained the prestige of being a 
considerate substitute for court decisions. Contrary to adjudication, it offers a quick, less 
costly and effective settlement of cases, to which parties often voluntarily comply with, 
                                                
17 See supra note 9, σελίς 77 
18 See supra note 7, σελίς 32 
19 See supra note 7, σελίς 40 
20 Large-Moran Pamela, “Ethical Standards for Mediators: The Utility of Professional Codes of Conduct”,  
    Conflict Resolution Services (CRS) Atlantic, p. 4-5;  
    Αµανατίδης Ηλίας, «Η διαδικασία της διαµεσολάβησης», Νοµικό Περιοδικό «Ενώπιον», τεύχος 52, 
    Ιούλιος – Αύγουστος 2009, σελίδες 12-13 
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the enforceability of the resolution, and the possibility of improving opposing parties’ 
relationship that would normally be destroyed after a lengthy trial. This advantage is 
particularly important in family cases, where matters of child custody, parenting time, 
alimony, etc. are involved.  
The outmost goal of the process is to defend the civil rights of the parties and 
provide a fair and just outcome, namely to confer justice. To achieve this goal 
mediation is regulated under the auspices of a nation’s wider legal framework, namely 
Constitutional Rules, European secondary legislation21 and Civil Procedural Principles, 
which are usually implicitly or explicitly incorporated into national mediation law and 
Code of Conduct22 to serve as a guide for the handling of mediation on equal grounds 
for both parties. More specifically the values of mediation, the process itself, the role of 
the mediator, the available remedies and the submission to and/or the mediation 
agreement signed by the parties, play important role in serving fairness.  
Mediation process retains its own autonomy towards litigation and arbitration. It 
includes a specific structure of stages (preparation, opening, exploration, negotiation 
and conclusion) that are carefully constructed to guide parties smoothly from one stage 
to another, whereas practitioners of mediation suggest that bypassing a stage rushing to 
the end is not recommended, as it can jeopardize the whole procedure. Due to its 
informality the disputants have the opportunity to tailor it, in collaboration with the 
mediator, according to the needs of their case. No Procedural Rules of evidence apply. 
The main part of mediation is usually conducted in the exploration and negotiation 
stage, where the mediator meets privately with each party (private sessions) and 
encourages them to actively participate in resolving the case, trying to focus on the core 
issues of the dispute and explore possible solutions. At the last stage, if parties find an 
arrangement, they draft an agreement that is signed by them, their legal counsels and the 
mediator.  
 
 
 
                                                
21 European Directive 2008/52 of the European Parliament and Council on certain aspects of   
    mediation in civil and commercial disputes 
22 European Code of Conduct, Articles: 2.2 (impartiality), 3.1 (procedure), 3.2 (fairness of the process); 
    American Bar Association. American Arbitration Association, Association for Conflict Resolution  
   “Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators”, Standard I (self-determination), Standard II  
    (impartiality), Standard VI (quality of the process) 
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VII.- APPLICATION OF THE ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM’S 
PROCEDURAL PRINCIPLES IN MEDIATION 
Mediation is based on the principle of parties’ self-determination, i.e. in their 
voluntary participation to the process, their non-coerced decision making pursuant to 
which each party actively participates in mediation and makes free and informed 
choices as to process and outcome23. In its most extreme application, self-determination 
provide parties with the right to withdraw from the process, if during mediation they 
feel they cannot trust the process or the mediator, or if they believe it cannot serve their 
needs.  
In the adversary system, once a lawsuit is filed before a court, the defendant is 
literally “dragged to it”. If he does not participate in trial, his default produces 
procedural and substantial consequences that often end up in his losing the case. Self-
determination applies to the scope of subject matter that can be introduced into trial. 
Parties abide by certain procedural rules and have little implication in the process. They 
have to comply with the court order.  
Contrary to publicity of the sessions in litigation, confidentiality is another core 
principle of mediation that governs the communication of either party with the mediator 
in private sessions, as well as all information obtained by the mediator, unless otherwise 
agreed by the parties or required by applicable law24. A mediator cannot be summoned 
as a witness to testify before a court about exchanged proposals for settlement or 
confidential issues he learnt during mediation, if the unsatisfied party later initiates 
litigation for the subject matter of the case25. Confidentiality is one of the main reasons 
why parties usually choose mediation to resolve their dispute, especially when they are 
involved in cases with sensitive issues (business secrets, family divorce) which they 
prefer to keep for themselves.  
Neutrality and impartiality of the third person in mediation means that the 
mediator does not judge the liability of the parties for the damage caused, does not 
express his opinion about the exchanged proposals at the negotiation stage, does not 
play the role of a counsel, nor does he recommend or render a decision. His main task is 
                                                
23 See supra note 22 p. 12, “Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators” ABA.AAA.ACR, Standard I; 
    Greek Mediation Law 3898/2010 Article 4 section b (ΦΕΚ A211/2010); 
    See supra note 21 p. 12, Article 3 section a  
24 See supra note 22 p. 12, “Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators” ABA.AAA.ACR, Standard V 
25 Harvard Law Review, “Protecting Confidentiality in Mediation”, Vol. 98, No. 2 (1984), p. 454 
    See supra note 22 p. 12, Article 7;  
    See supra note 23, Greek Mediation Law, Article 10 & 2 
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to assist the communication of the parties and to enable them reach a viable solution. In 
litigation, as we have already mentioned, the role of the judge is completely different. 
Finally, the non-binding character of the process means that the proposals 
exchanged by the parties during the course of the negotiation stage do not bind them 
until a final settlement is written and signed.  
 
VIII.- APPLICATION OF ARBITRATION’S PRINCIPLES IN 
MEDIATION 
Being an ADR method to litigation, mediation performs within the normative 
boundaries of arbitration, although with some fundamental differences.  
Confidentiality applies both in arbitration and mediation with the difference that 
in the latter it binds all participants to maintain this obligation before, during and after 
mediation. Only the fact that a settlement has been achieved or not, can be testified by 
the mediator before a court of law, whereas arbitral awards usually become public as 
confidentiality applies strictly on the explicit agreement of the parties. However 
according to recent US case-law26, issues of mediator’s obligation to abide by this 
principle have been adjusted to the specific nature of a case (for instance labour cases) 
and to the social impact a settlement produces for public interest, in order to serve 
justice beyond the closed boundaries of a mediated case.  
The mediation process is informal. Parties do not need to choose a law to 
conduct it. Normally, national mediation law outlines only the basic procedural 
framework which shall be administered by a mediator with or without a legal 
background, being a judge, a lawyer, a civil engineer, a psychologist etc. Legal issues 
normally concern mediation to the degree that they provide a clear picture of the risk 
assessment, namely of the chances of winning or losing in court, if a resolution is not 
found. Moreover, a mediated settlement may contain terms and conditions that bind the 
participants to satisfy the needs and interests of third persons who do not engage in the 
process, whereas in arbitration the signatories of the arbitration agreement are the only 
ones who participate in the process and who are bound by the arbitral award.  
Finally, in mediation the parties do not literally submit and support their 
arguments but only state their positions and express their will of what would be an 
                                                
26 Gibson Kevin, “Confidentiality in Mediation: A Moral Reassessment”, Journal of Dispute Resolution,  
    Issue 1, Vol. 1992, No. 1, p. 35-39 (Cases: Tomlinson of High Point, Inc; NLRB v. Joseph Macaluso, 
    Inc; Bottarro v. Hatton Associates; Adler v. Adams; Simrin v. Simrin)  
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acceptable outcome for them. This positional-based negotiation will eventually be 
transformed into an interest-based discussion for what they truly need. In arbitration the 
disputants practically litigate their case based on specific substantial and legal rights 
that the law provides.  
Impartiality and neutrality regard the process as well as the outcome in both 
procedures with the distinction that an arbitrator renders a binding award, whereas a 
mediator has no such obligation, unless asked by the parties to disclose his opinion. 
Despite the aforementioned differences, both procedures recognize that parties 
should be provided with equal opportunities to exercise their legal rights and duties, and 
the right of being heard.  
 
VIII.- ETHICAL DILEMMAS  
Mediation has a specific procedural structure consisting of its own values, the 
different stages of process, the mediator’s role and Codes of Conduct, which provide a 
general guidance to ethical challenges and the mediation agreement, whereby parties 
state the rules that will govern a particular process. The substance of the case is a 
different issue. It concerns the core of the conflict, the discussions in the exploration 
and negotiation stage and the outcome of mediation that may be either a settlement or a 
failure27. However, as mediation goes on, the distinction of process and content within 
stages proves rather difficult, as content usually shapes procedure depending on the 
needs that arise from the interaction between the parties or from their communication 
with the mediator. From the beginning until the end of mediation, the mediator is 
obliged to practically “judge” the power (im)balance, the progress or an apparent 
deadlock, the free will or the coercion dynamics that emerge between the participants, 
and decide if and how he has to continue the process, intervene, try to persuade the 
strong party into changing his/her position or acknowledging his/her unethical 
behaviour, insist on the strong party’s compliance with the agreements made before the 
initiation of mediation or suggest an option that seems more equitable to him.  
Answering these estimations is usually urgent as they concern practical issues 
which will shape the continuance of the process or cause a negative reaction, even the 
withdrawal of a participant. At these crucial moments, unfortunately, there is no 
guidance for a mediator to seek recourse to, as most Codes of Conduct often provide 
                                                
27 Coyle Michael, “Defending the Weak and Fighting Unfairness: Can Mediators Respond to the  
    Challenge?”, Osgoode Hall Law Journal, Vol. 36, No. 4, (1998), p. 636-637 
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general principles about his role and do not suggest solutions on specific ethical 
dilemmas. Despite the fact that there is no safe distinction between the process and the 
content of dialogue28, Principles of Codes of Conduct govern process, ignoring that 
discourse is the substance of every mediation stage and that the outcome of the 
decisions will formulate the terms and conditions of the final settlement. This is the 
reason why it has been argued that everything29 the mediator says or every proposal he 
makes, may have impact on the settlement, whereas questions regarding practical issues, 
such as his suggestion for a break of sessions, in order to give parties time to think of an 
option for the continuance of negotiation, could not possibly affect settlement. 
 Moreover we should distinguish between the wide range of intervention choices 
a mediator makes, in relation to those that an adjudicator or an arbitrator makes in the 
safe framework of legal rules, which specifically limit his options and lead him towards 
a more or less predictable award. The mediator does not know whether his choices will 
ensure a successful process, neither what the result of the mediation might be. Although 
his judgements may resemble the ones made by an attorney, in the course of rebutting 
the proposals of his opponent in the negotiation stage, the latter also happens within the 
boundaries of substantive law and legal remedies available. An attorney similarly faces 
the prospect of success or failure of his decisions in the predictable legal environment30.  
And this is the point where the first question arises. Does the procedural 
structure of mediation serve fairness? In other words, is it capable of guaranteeing a just 
outcome? If law provides that specific cases shall be submitted mandatorily to 
mediation before going to litigation, how is the weak party affected? In cases of power 
imbalance, what are the choices of the mediator? Does he have the authority to 
intervene and to what degree, in order to regulate a situation, when one of the parties is 
trying to monopolize the process, for example by a long lasting introductory 
monologue? Will the mediator’s intervention be interpreted as partiality? Can he insist 
on a withdrawal of a proposal, when the strong party reveals that (s)he has deceived 
his/her opponent by providing lacking information about the material facts of the 
dispute? What are his choices, when one party is intimidating or threatening the other 
with physical abuse or economic disaster? What is the definition of an illegal activity? 
                                                
28 MacFarlane Julie, “Mediating Ethically: The Limits of Codes of Conduct and the Potential of a  
    Reflective Practice Model”, Osgoode Hall Law Journal, Vol. 40, No. 1 (2002), p. 60 
29 See supra note 28, p. 58 
30 See supra note 28, p. 59 
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Is there a difference between an illegal behaviour and “furthering” an illegal activity 
itself31? What is the impact of the mediator’s personality, ethical values and self-
respect? What does the cultural background of the participants dictate about their 
expectations of a neutral and impartial mediator? To what degree are the norms decided 
by the parties in the mediation agreement binding, when one of them is attempting to 
violate them, thinking that confidentiality binds the mediator from communicating the 
violation to the other party? Are there specific skills that a mediator should have 
depending on the nature of the case?  
The aforementioned questions are some examples of ethical dilemmas that may 
emerge in mediation. The lack of a formal structure of the process in relation to the 
inability of the mediator to intervene strongly during the course of mediation or to 
impose a fair solution, are extra challenges, which generate even more doubt as to what 
can an individual expect and how safe he might feel by engaging in the process. The 
issue becomes more critical, when somebody considers the proposed advantages of 
mediation for a mutually acceptable solution that will serve both parties’ interests and 
needs. In other words, we have to appraise what are the express or implied promises 
made to the disputants by the mediator about his role and the successful dynamic of the 
process.  
Prior to deciding to mediate their case, disputants usually attempt to reach a 
negotiated settlement through their representatives or lawyers who may have used 
various tactics to secure a position for attack or defense. Depending on the type of the 
negotiator (analytical, creative, diplomatic etc.) these tactics may include dishonest 
tricks or actions32 (such as delays for a senior approval, bulling, escalation of claims, 
misleading data, etc.) and more importantly lies. In confirmation of this practice, the 
principle that often prevails in negotiation, dictates that in order to achieve a negotiated 
agreement or to maximize one’s profit, parties are “entitled or permitted to lie”33. 
Despite the fact that such believes in real practice have already proven to be ineffective 
because of failing to provide an acceptable outcome for the disputants, they cannot be 
accepted in mediation under any circumstances. The use of good will or bad faith rules 
reflects what parties consider as permissible or even ethical tactic in negotiation, and 
                                                
31 See supra note 28, p. 81 
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    2010 
33 Wetlaufer B. Gerald, “The Ethics of Lying in Negotiations”, 75, Iowa Law Review, 1219, (1990) p.  
    1245 
18 
 
what they will probably do or expect their representatives to do in mediation34 to 
counter-ague or nullify the opponent’s claims. Nevertheless, there is one ground rule 
which suggests that neither party will be willing or expected to disclose its reservation 
point, i.e. the minimum amount he is prepared to accept by the other side to settle the 
case, to the mediator, let alone to its opponent, as this fact itself would render him 
helpless and absolutely deprive him from his negotiating power.  
The mediation agreement usually contains the parties’ expectations regarding 
the role of the mediator, the issues to be discussed, and reflect the factual, legal and 
social background of the dispute35. It is at the preparation stage where the experienced 
mediator will foresee and draw questions regarding disclosure of evidence, defining 
acceptable negotiation behaviour and the mediator’s remedies in case one party violates 
the set rules and raises issues of unfairness. The parties should specifically agree that 
they will negotiate diligently and in good faith36, conferring upon the mediator the 
authority to use the remedies they have consented upon and waiving their right to 
withdraw from the process due to “mediator’s partiality”. The rule regarding the 
reservation point should also be included along with the statement that, if the mediator 
finds out that an intentionally misleading, false or inaccurate information is being used 
by one of the participants in order to deceive the opponent, the parties agree that he is 
entitled to gradually respond by the following remedies: he will attempt to persuade the 
party to alter its statement or proposal; he will remind the party of the type of 
negotiation he agreed to before the initiation of the process; he will reveal the deceptive 
information and this action will not be deemed as partial or breaking the rule of 
confidentiality; he will terminate mediation and/or report to the negotiator’s superiors 
(who are represented in mediation by the particular negotiator) about his non 
compliance with the agreed rules and the failure of the process out of his own liability.  
The mediator should “educate”37 parties about the nature of the process they are 
engaging in, by explaining that mediation goes beyond the narrow boundaries of a 
competitive or an adversarial process and the logic of win-lose solutions. This is the 
reason why not acting in good faith is not compatible with mediation values. A 
mediation agreement drafted by the disputants’ express consent which contains specific 
                                                
34 See supra note 33, p. 1246-1248 
35 See supra note 27, p. 651 
36 See supra note 27, p. 663 
37 Maise Michelle “Neutrality” Beyond Intractability, The Conflict Information Consortium, University of  
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norms for the conduct of the process and the mediator remedies, will give them the 
possibility to think of the variety of controversial issues they had not realized up to now, 
and probably decrease the chances of mischievous behaviour.  
 
IX.- CODES OF CONDUCT  
Codes of Conduct prescribe the model standards that provide the fundamental 
ethical guidelines for mediators38 to assist them with the complex issues that may arise 
in mediation. First of all, Codes of Conduct add credibility and promote people’s 
confidence in mediation process by providing a specific framework for mediators’ 
actions. Their purpose is to balance the disadvantage of informality which may cause 
distrust regarding procedural fairness against a potential exploitation by the party who 
owes higher status, greater financial resources and expertise39. Second, they define the 
guidelines that help mediators address deceptive and unfair negotiation. Third, they 
enhance public recognition of mediation as a distinct profession from that of an 
individual counsel, attorney, therapist or negotiator.  
Codes of Conduct focus on the principles that govern the role of mediators, such 
as self-determination, impartiality, conflicts of interest, competence and confidentiality 
and generally regard that a potential violation of their provisions is deemed to be an 
ethical dilemma to which mediators should react timely and sufficiently in order to 
comply with the rules. However they do not answer what a mediator should do to secure 
substantial fairness.  
Very often a mediator has to value conflicting interests and eliminate any traces 
of parties’ distrust regarding his commitment to be neutral and impartial. A value-based 
decision can be extremely difficult to make because of the significance a value may 
represent for each party. Individual opinions and beliefs about values tend to be quite 
stable and non-negotiable40, whereas conflict is at most times conceived as a threat to 
somebody’s needs, interests or concerns41. An individual, who participates in mediation 
believing that the mediator will guarantee his right to a fair hearing and meet 
challenging behaviour of the other participant, might perceive a mediator’s 
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phenomenally controversial choice as partial. At this point we have to remember that 
parties are in conflict, and attempt to resolve their dispute outside the formal adversary 
system which supplies them with specific procedural rules that secure their rights and 
serve values beyond doubt. In most disputes42 parties have already asked the assistance 
of their attorneys to examine the material facts and legal issues of the case, and are 
already aware of their chances to win or lose in courts. The information they have 
obtained about the legal aspects of the dispute has provided them with a “filter”43, 
which produces a specific perception of the legal acceptability of their position. If they 
have prepared to litigate the case, this perception has upgraded into a firm conviction 
for the validity of the lawsuit and the chances of winning in litigation. Therefore the fact 
that the parties voluntarily choose to submit their dispute to mediation cannot be 
appraised as an equal withdrawal of their rights, nor has their adversarial perspective 
transformed into a “pure cooperative” approach. This is the reason why parties often 
tend to respond to the “perceived” threats rather than to an “objective” reality44. This 
position-based logical and psychological framework outlines the significance that a 
mediator’s value-based decision can have for the parties, who need to feel his 
commitment to the principles of mediation as they were promised to.  
Moreover, in case the participants were forced to engage in mediation by law or 
court decision, a mediator’s choice between two or more conflicting activities emerging 
from different principles renders a value-based decision even more important for a 
smooth conduct of the mediation process. A characteristic example of ethical dilemma, 
which shows the insufficiency of Codes of Conduct to respond, is when the mediator 
faces the challenge of deciding between a collision of competing principles, for instance 
confidentiality and impartiality. In this case, Codes of Conduct do not provide the 
mediator with a safe guidance, for instance a priority perspective to help him choose 
among the two principles, but on the contrary they ask for the application of both, which 
in practice is confusing and merely impossible45.  
A value-based decision is according to the mediator’s beliefs, the best action 
based on a superior, among two or more, values that answers efficiently the particular 
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43 Bucklow Amanda and Middleton-Smith Charles, “Foundation Mediation Skills Training Programme”  
    facilitat8, p. 38, Mediation Training of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators 
44 See supra note 41, p. 3 
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challenge46. For instance the issue of whether the mediator should intervene or not by 
asking a question or making a suggestion, or decide to refrain from any response and let 
tensions defuse by themselves and the process continue, is a choice that once made, 
produces results and generates other decisions regarding the degree of intervention. For 
example, does the mediator have to separate parties and continue with private sessions? 
What should he do, if he understands at the negotiation stage that one party has not 
realized the consequences of his commitment, in case he accepts by final settlement the 
proposal made by the other party? By all means not all choices are ethical, as questions 
may arise regarding practical issues, such as, whether mediation will be scheduled at 
day time or in the evening47. This mediator’s decision could be deemed to be partial, if 
it practically rejects one party’s preference and complies with the one made by the 
opponent. Finally, a characteristic example of how delicate balance can be in mediation, 
is the significance of the shape of the meeting table, which should convey a sense of fair 
balance for both disputants!  
Codes of Conduct seem to provide mediators with “right” or “wrong” answers 
as if they can predict good or bad human behaviour and reaction during an ongoing 
communication. They ignore the dynamics that develop through the parties’ discourse 
and mediator’s interaction with them, namely through management of human 
relationships48, the types of which are countless and definitely not predictable. They 
more importantly seem to forget that each mediator has distinct character and personal 
style, and his own standards and preferences do reflect the techniques he applies and his 
(re)action to a challenge by virtue of his own judgement. In reality, only expertise and 
accumulated practical experience of the mediator can assist him to cope with difficult 
situations, as a specific mediation is different from any other he has conducted before. 
No matter how well he has been prepared, or despite parties’ understandings contained 
in the mediation agreement, complex issues may arise before, during and after 
mediation49 jeopardizing the success of the process. Another crucial point is the fact that 
ethical dilemmas in mediation usually arise during the course of conflict, where tensions 
are high and the sense of equilibrium is fragile. At these moments the response depends 
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on the mediator’s discretion. There are no universal rules that dictate a “right” answer or 
registry of cases he can turn to, to get advice.  
Moreover, Codes of Conduct assume that it is the mediator’s duty to cope with 
complicated ethical dilemmas. They intend to assist him by providing a specific 
normative structure for a diversity of ethical dilemmas. The matter becomes more 
challenging, when one considers that the professional background of mediators may 
vary from lawyers and judges to non-lawyers, whereas Codes of Conduct are usually 
directed to lawyers – mediators50 (!) In this regard, the question that arises is where do 
the non-lawyers mediators are supposed to look at, to get guidance for ethical dilemmas 
they may face during the course of mediation, when they have no professional Rules of 
Conduct to help them? An important research conducted by Robert A. Baruch Bush51 in 
practicing mediators, categorized ethical dilemmas into 5 types, as follows: keeping 
within the limits of competency, preserving impartiality, maintaining confidentiality, 
ensuring informed consent and preserving self-determination, to conclude, among 
others, that practicing mediators are very much concerned about conducting mediation 
according to its rules and values, understand deeply the wide range of ethical dilemmas 
they may face, and are willing to resolve them appropriately and efficiently52. This need 
for effectiveness and sufficiency is reflected in practice by the general requisition of 
Codes of Conduct, that mediators should be competent and knowledgeable in the 
process of mediation and regularly update their knowledge and skills by taking training 
courses or attending educational programmes53.  
 Finally, according to Standard VI paragraph 9 of the Model Standards of 
Conduct for Mediators of ABA “if mediation is being used to further criminal conduct, 
a mediator should take appropriate steps including, if necessary, postponing, 
withdrawing from or terminating the process”. By analogy, the European Code of 
Conduct for Mediators in Article 3.2 states that “the mediator if appropriate shall 
inform the parties, and may terminate the mediation, if: a settlement is being reached 
that for the mediator appears … illegal, having regard to the circumstances of the case 
and the competence of the mediator for making such an assessment …” These 
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provisions bring up a very important issue that may arise during the course of 
mediation. They both refer to an act of penal nature, a criminal conduct or an illegal 
settlement, and although a reference to a criminal conduct seems easy to the 
unsuspicious reader, it proves to be quite problematic, when we want to distinguish it 
from an illegal behaviour or from “furthering” an illegal activity itself54. In general 
terms one can argue that an illegal activity that has already taken place between the 
parties and is disclosed to the mediator during mediation, should not trouble him, if it is 
not the subject of the present dispute. Moreover, an illegal activity should be 
distinguished from a criminal conduct of a hideous nature rejected by the legal system 
and the public opinion. For instance, the infringement of the secrecy of letters that has 
violated the business secrets of one disputant’s firm is an illegal act and it does raise 
questions of unfair competition. However, it cannot be regarded as criminal conduct and 
cannot end up in obliging the mediator take one of the aforementioned remedies. On the 
contrary, a criminal conduct or an illegal settlement that regards causing physical harm 
to one of the participants in mediation or against third parties or risking other people’s 
lives not involved in the process, are examples of criminal conduct. The Greek 
Mediation Law (N. 3898/2010, Article 10 paragraph 2) which regulates confidentiality 
in relation to obligations and rights of the parties (mediator, legal representatives, 
parties) in mediation, provides that none of them shall be examined as a witness nor is 
he obliged to bring proof or elements related to the mediation that has already taken 
place, “unless such an obligation is imposed by rules of public order to secure 
primarily the protection of minors or to avoid the danger of risking the physical 
integrity or the mental health of a person”. In the latter case the specificity of law omits 
the ethical dilemma of what the appropriate reaction of the mediator should be, by 
imposing on him the duty to report to the official authorities (police department, Public 
Prosecutor) about the information he has been aware of, categorizing confidentiality as 
an obligation of secondary importance. However neither of the aforementioned 
provisions states what the implications will be for the mediator, who does not comply 
with the responsibility of reporting the criminal activity. Does he run the risk of being 
accused as an accomplice of the parties? 
Finally, a mediator has an additional challenge to face. He has to be competent 
to withdraw his personal opinion and ethical values from the outcome he detects the 
                                                
54 See supra note 28, p. 81 
24 
 
parties are going to settle for. He has to find a balance between his own ethical 
standards, the parties’ expectations and ethical values, and the goals and principles of 
mediation.  
 
X.- THE ROLE OF THE MEDIATOR 
The role of the mediator itself is the key element which distinguishes this 
particular method from the rest ADR methods. His presence adds value to the process 
by the application of his skills and techniques. In most cases his goal is to resolve 
conflict. To achieve this, he listens actively by showing empathy55 for the participants’ 
feelings and experience, shows understanding, enhances communication, promotes 
collaborative negotiation by moving from positional to interest based negotiation and 
avoids or resolves deadlocks. Moreover, mediation requires an atmosphere free of 
restraint and intimidation to be effective and successful. A mediator is responsible for 
creating a safe environment, where both parties feel they can express their concerns 
freely. The goal is to inspire parties trust in him as competent to administer the process 
and handle the opponent, as well as the emerging issues. Trust discerns him from being 
merely another counsel of one of the parties. Once gained, mediation can successfully 
proceed. To gain parties’ trust the mediator has to be firm with the process and values of 
mediation, in addition with the agreed rules contained in the submission and/or the 
mediation agreement. Another crucial challenge for him is to build rapport56 with the 
parties by giving them, among a variety of different ways of conduct, a sense that he 
understands their positions and wills. At this point a distinction between the two notions 
is necessary: Gaining trust does not mean building rapport. This is usually the relation 
of a judge with the disputants that bring their case to trial, whereby the latter respect and 
believe in the judge’s skills and knowledge and anticipate a fair decision. On the 
contrary, having rapport but no trust between two individuals could mean having a 
friendly, intimate relation without aiming at the resolution of the problem. However, a 
mediator needs to have accomplished successfully both tasks to be able to work with the 
parties on their conflict and conduct mediation.  
By virtue of law he administers the process by drafting the submission or 
mediation agreement, establishing agendas and ground rules to promote and facilitate 
communication between the parties, choosing the party who will speak, determining the 
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appropriate duration for each disputant’s introductory speech, deciding who he will first 
have a private session with or whether the level of progress made during private 
sessions enables him to rejoin parties in a common session to discuss openly the 
remaining issues, allowing the participation of third persons (special scientists, experts), 
making reality checking, revealing underlying issues (if allowed to or obligated by law), 
terminating prematurely the mediation if he believes there is a danger for the safety of 
third people not involved in the process, postponing the discussion for another day and 
supervising the drafting of the settlement.   
The mediator should be a skilled negotiator. The knowledge of principles and 
functions of negotiation enables him to acknowledge tactics and maneuvers parties and 
their representatives use during mediation to convince or mislead the opponent. 
Moreover the mediator should be aware of the underlying psychological mechanisms57 
of the parties at the initiation of the process, who usually tend to combine the notion of 
fairness with positions or proposals that benefit themselves, being unwilling to admit 
that this stance will ruin every possibility of negotiating and finally result in a deadlock. 
It is also important to have in mind that the parties usually focus on the opponents’ 
actions and interpret them as evil and aggressive bargaining, whereas at the same time 
they believe that their own positions should be understood as reflecting the best 
intentions and good will! This is an impasse the mediator is aware of and it is also the 
first challenge he will have to overcome to build the ground for an effective 
communication. To facilitate his understanding of the case the disputants should inform 
him of their prior attempts to negotiate the case before ending up in mediation, and of 
the degree of acceptance or failure of these attempts. This knowledge will enhance the 
mediator’s power and flexibility arising from parties’ choices or preferences, and help 
him find the best possible options in the exploration and negotiation stage for the 
resolution of the dispute.  
 
XI.- THE VALUES OF MEDIATION 
Apart from the aforementioned general duties, the values of mediation i.e. self-
determination, neutrality, impartiality, confidentiality and the non-binding character of 
the process, dictate the mediator’s performance and stance and serve him as guiding 
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lines to address ethical dilemmas, despite the doubts they raise for their sufficiency and 
effectiveness.  
 
A) SELF-DETERMINATION 
Self-determination is a principle that runs through the whole mediation and 
regards the ability of making free and informed choices, starting from the mediator 
selection and ending up with the drafting of the terms of a settlement or with one or 
both parties’ withdrawal from the process58, if they feel it does not meet their 
expectations or they cannot trust the procedure or the mediator. This latter possibility is 
based on the disputants’ voluntary participation in mediation, in its most extreme sense. 
Principle of self-determination is violated when law or a court order obliges parties to 
submit their dispute to mediation before initiating litigation.  
Self-determination is a core value of mediation and at the same time the most 
risky disadvantage for a free will arrangement and the satisfaction of the interests and 
needs of both parties, due to the lack of formal procedure and the inability of mediator 
to impose a fair settlement. No one can ever predict whether mediation will be 
conducted in a mutually collaborative spirit, as sometimes power imbalance is not 
evident from the start, but when revealed, the mediator has to intervene to help the weak 
argue for his/her interests. Self-determination is based on the free, active and equal 
engagement of the disputants in the process, which in case it does not exist, there will 
be no ground for a fair and equitable outcome, and the mediator is obliged to terminate 
the procedure.  
 
B) NEUTRALITY 
One of the key virtues of a mediator is his neutrality which enhances his 
authority before the eyes of the conflicting parties who want to be treated equally and 
need to trust the third party in conducting the process. However, this notion in practice 
can be defined in various ways depending on the way each individual interprets 
neutrality, the cultural background he comes from, and the mediation mentality that 
formulated the mediator’s style. Before the initiation of the process, a mediator rarely 
explains the parties what they should expect from him as neutral and that is why 
misunderstandings usually occur regarding his role. The issue becomes more complex 
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when the “triad” of individuals, mediator and parties59, involved in the resolution of the 
dispute, comes from different countries where distinct ethics apply. For example, a 
British mediator is normally expected firmly not to take sides during the process, not to 
intervene with the substance of the dispute, and finally does not aim at a settlement but 
rather works to secure procedural fairness. On the exact opposite side a Latin-American 
mediator can be an insider-partial, namely someone who may be aligned with one of the 
parties, but this stance is not deemed to be an impediment on behalf of the parties for 
the continuance of mediation, who still respect him and trust him as being fair60. These 
two characteristic examples produce immense impact to participants who may be 
nationals of different countries between them as well with the mediator. That is why the 
choice of the mediator is significant for the successful conduct of the process, and his 
style may be significant for the impact of power imbalance issues on the value system 
of each party.  
A definition of being neutral is having no conflicting relationship with either of 
the parties, namely not being involved in the subject matter of the dispute, or not 
maintaining any kind of relationship with either of the parties61. Additionally, the 
mediator is required to conduct a “reasonable inquiry”62 to find out whether an issue of 
partiality might arise. In case of existing proof or even suspicion of conflict, he shall 
disclose it to the parties who are free to decide to proceed or not with mediation. 
A more extreme explanation of neutrality dictates that the mediator is indifferent 
in parties’ welfare. It is unlikely, however, whether once this stance is disclosed to the 
participants, the latter will be willing to engage in the process with the particular 
mediator, as their inner necessity is to co-operate with someone who really wants to 
resolve their dispute and release them from trouble.  
Nevertheless, maintaining a neutral stance can prove to be rather challenging in 
cases of power imbalance, where the strong party gains control leaving the opponent 
silent and helpless, or when the weak party cannot communicate clearly his/her side of 
the truth. The ethical dilemma which arises for the mediator is, if he can intervene to 
restore the strong party’s commitment to the initial agreements made regarding the 
acceptable type of negotiation the participants agreed to use, or whether he should 
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regard the principle of confidentiality as prevailing and “conceal” the apparent 
unfairness. Another matter that should be taken into consideration is that the mediator 
has practically no means to investigate the substance and truthfulness of evidence that is 
being produced, nor can he oblige parties to bring him proof, i.e. the necessary 
documents63, which verify the honesty of their allegations.  
 
C) IMPARTIALITY 
The notion of impartiality seems to be similar or slightly confusing, in relation 
to neutrality; nevertheless it has a distinct meaning which produces its own dynamic for 
the process and the mediator’s role. It refers to the even-handedness of the mediator and 
more particularly to the objectivity and fairness he has to show to both parties during 
the course of mediation. Being objective simply means focusing on facts and not being 
influenced by personal feelings or opinions about what the best solution for the 
particular dispute should be. This stance enhances the mediator’s credibility and 
attributed power among the “triad” of participants in mediation, facilitating in the end 
the performance of his duties and the acceptance and respect of the parties. According 
to Standard II of the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators of ABA “impartiality 
means freedom from favoritism, bias or prejudice” which obliges the mediator “to 
decline a mediation if he cannot conduct it in an impartial manner”. The further 
analysis provided regarding this Standard explains in detail the explicit actions, 
opinions or beliefs a mediator should refrain from, and additionally takes into account 
the cultural factor of the parties that he should respect in order to conduct mediation 
successfully. This possibility verifies the rule that the informality of the process 
provides the parties involved with the opportunity to tailor it according to their needs. 
Pursuant to Article 2.2 of the European Code of Conduct for Mediators, “the 
mediator shall at all times act, and endeavour to be seen to act, with impartiality 
towards the parties and be committed to serve all parties equally with respect to the 
process of mediation”.  
Although these provisions impose specific duties on a mediator, there may be 
cases where serving impartiality practically means taking measures, i.e. in simple terms, 
intervening in the process to redress power imbalance, whereas at the same time this 
stance contradicts the mediator’s neutrality duty. What will the mediator choose? 
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According to most Codes of Conducts, as we have already mentioned, he has to comply 
with both principles. However, in reality, mediators cannot be completely even-handed 
and keep equal distance from the parties, because this would mean supporting the 
powerful one against the weak64. From all the above, and as we shall see later 
examining cases of family abuse, we conclude that the mediator has the potential to 
decide to intervene on behalf of the weak party who is in a critical situation of being 
exploited or deceived, and overlook the prescribed duties of neutrality and 
impartiality65, the application of which may, in a certain situation, result in a grossly 
unjust outcome that a court decision would never permit.  
 
D) CONFIDENTIALITY 
The principle of confidentiality primarily seems to reflect a strict rule upon both 
the participants and the mediator. It has two aspects: it concerns private information 
gathered through the process of mediation and parties’ trust for the mediator and the 
process66. However, a question arises concerning whether preserving this privilege of 
mediation, is necessary for the performance of the process itself by the mediator67. 
Practice has shown that the degree of absolutism68 or relativism this principle applies, 
depends on the subject matter of the dispute and the implications a settlement might 
have for third persons who do not engage in mediation. For instance, the issues that may 
arise from a family case vary significantly from the ones of a labour case, where the 
intimacy of communications could probably harm other employees who will remain 
unaware of the scope of the negotiation boundaries of their employer, as well as of the 
outcome of the previously settled case, and will be obliged to go through the same 
process mediating their disputes from scratch. Confidentiality can also be contrary to 
public interest, where cases involve wide groups of people or social organizations who 
are not represented as legal persons in a specific mediation.  
The mediator’s experience can help him foresee possible challenges regarding 
the firmness of applying confidentiality. Exceptions established by law, such as child 
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abuse or imminent harm to others, should be extended by analogy to abuse of elderly or 
mentally defective people who have been incapable of defending themselves or 
unwilling of reporting the incident to the police because of intimidation or threat69. 
However, violent incidents should be specifically included in the mediation agreement 
as exceptions of confidentiality, because there may be no legal requirement imposing a 
duty of disclosure to a mediator. In any event, illegal acts not included in the mediation 
agreement should be judged on a basis of appropriateness and proportionality, namely 
the mediator should evaluate the harm already done with the benefit that could arise for 
both parties from a possible settlement70. Preserving confidentiality should enhance the 
chances of reaching a solution without undermining one party’s rights, or should 
increase the possibility of improving the relationship of the participants. These 
estimations have to be made on a wider distinction between morality and law71. Thus, 
there are examples of a perfectly legal act being immoral, for instance racism may be 
legal according to the laws of a state but it is absolutely immoral. Abuse or murder are 
both immoral and illegal, whereas “white” lies or broken promises may not be illegal, 
although they are immoral.   
The significance of confidentiality as a general rule should be estimated within a 
wider framework of mediator abilities, parties’ expectations, securing the procedural 
fairness of mediation and promoting a cooperative spirit of communication. The limits 
however, between confidentiality and impartiality are fragile, as, if a mediator is 
required to disclose a secret before a court, this testimony would probably be interpreted 
as breaking impartiality in favour of one of the parties. A more liberal aspect of the 
theme would argue that testifying before a court only about the facts and the outcome of 
mediation without expressing his own believes and biases should not be regarded as 
violation of impartiality on behalf of the mediator.  
 
E) THE NON BINDING CHARACTER  
It regards the exchange of proposals during the negotiation stage. Parties are not  
bound by them, until they write and sign an agreement containing the final terms which 
resolve their dispute.  
                                                
69 See supra note 12 at p. 7 
70 See supra note 26, p. 34 : Wigmore Test: sets 4 criteria in order to regard confidentiality as protected  
    public right, in relation to the maintenance of presidential secrecy; it was applied by President Nixon in  
    the Watergate Affair 
71 See supra note 26, p. 8 
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XII.- POWER 
Power has its own sources, principles and functions by its own logic. In general 
terms it can be defined as the ability to prevail upon others and “get what one wants”72, 
or “the ability to influence the behaviour of someone else to get the desired outcome”73. 
It can also be understood as “control of or access to emotional, economic and physical 
resources desired by the other person”74.  
An individual’s power may derive from a combination of factors according to 
the nature of the case. In a family case, involving domestic abuse or not, power may 
derive from one’s system of belief, personality, self-esteem, gender, selfishness, force, 
income, knowledge, status, age and education75. In a commercial dispute, power may 
come from equilibrium of: profit (tangible or intangible, direct or indirect etc.), reward 
and punishment, knowledge and information, competition, investment (in time, money 
or effort) etc.76.  
In mediation the basic sources of power spring from financial capacity, 
knowledge and expertise. Practicing mediators often face cases where power imbalance 
is evident from the preparation stage, or disclosed to them by the spouse-victim in cases 
of family abuse. In other situations, power imbalance is revealed during mediation, 
when it is maliciously used by the strong party who wants to impose his/her own 
solution according to his/her own terms. A mediator should be sensitive to issues of 
imbalance, and although any intervention by his side is practically an active 
involvement with all the known biased implications, he has the responsibility to 
maintain a quality process and guarantee the equal exercise of the parties’ rights.  
The mediator is the most powerful party of the triad: He administers the whole 
process and controls parties’ contact; he knows how to identify equilibrium between the 
clients and interpret the meaning of body language, i.e. physical stance, verbal 
communication, tone of voice and non verbal elements77.  
                                                
72 Parenti M.J., “Power and Powerless”, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1978, p. 4 
73 See supra note 32 
74 Neumann Diane, “How Mediation Can Effectively Address the Male-Female Power Imbalance in  
    Divorce”, Mediation Quarterly, Volume 9, Number 3, Spring 1992, reference to John Haynes 1988, p.  
    278 
75 Ver Steech Nancy, “Yes, No, and Maybe: Informed Decision Making about Divorce Mediation in the  
    Presence of Domestic Violence”, William & Mary Journal of Women and the Law, 2002-2003, p. 183 
76 See supra note 32, “The Sources of Power”  
77 Papakonstantinou Demosthenes, “Mastering Negotiations – Part III – Body Language”, Nomiki  
    Βibliothiki 
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The existence of power does not necessarily prescribe its use or misuse, which 
depends on the specific parties’ choices in a negotiation. Besides, a party who has the 
potential to influence the outcome to get what (s)he wants, may choose for personal, 
family or business reasons, not to take advantage of the situation and negotiate in good 
faith indeed. Moreover, power has its own features, the analysis of which can prove to 
be enlightening for the way it functions.  
Primarily, it is very rare that one side retains absolute power over the other.78 
Each party has a degree of power to express his will, feelings and opinions. However, 
unless someone is aware of his/her power, (s)he is not able to exercise it. In case the 
mediator realizes that (s)he cannot help a party enhance his/her communication and 
participation in the process, he may propose a counsel’s or an expert’s assistance.  
Moreover there is no presumption, such as the gender of the actors, which 
attributes in advance power to males as a class. A particular man can be powerless 
before a particular woman, that’s why power depends on the situations and varies in 
degree, which can change according to the circumstances and the different roles of each 
actor. For example, a man does not retain the same degree of power as husband, father, 
employee or member of a sports club79. Power is relative, as no one owns it 
continuously, i.e. a financially strong party may prove to be vulnerable under specific 
circumstances80.  
It is limited, i.e. a buyer does not always have the potential to influence the 
seller and get what he wants81, and it exists only within the limits that it is 
acknowledged and granted by one’s opponent.  
It depends on the transactional or other type of situations that may change and 
overturn the present imbalance. For instance, in a divorce case the spouse who initiates 
the procedure seems to retain more power regardless of his or her gender in relation to 
the other spouse who is being abandoned82 and the fact that the latter may have been the 
“strong” spouse until asked for a divorce.  
                                                
78 See supra note 32  
79 See supra note 74, p. 3 
80 See supra note 27, p. 649  
81 See supra note 32, “The Principles of Power” 
82 See supra note 74, p. 8 
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Finally, power may also be real or illusive, which means that it does not 
guarantee success to the individual, even if it derives from blackmail or rational 
argumentation83.  
 
A) VARIOUS TYPES OF POWER IMBALANCE IN MEDIATION 
Power imbalance in mediation has been observed in the following 
circumstances:  
1) In various forms of deceit or intimidation, such as distorting, misinterpreting 
or misrepresenting important elements of the case, not revealing the real amount one 
party can pay for the indemnification of his opponent, using misleading time margins 
(unreasonable delays, postponements, deadlines), monopolizing the discussion, namely 
precluding the other party from expressing his opinions or defending his interests, 
adopting a rigid/non-negotiable position, raising voice, using anger, irony84, personal 
attacks against the opponent to exercise psychological pressure in order to intimidate 
him/her, trying to make him/her do or accept anything out of guilt or pride etc.  
  2) A party in mediation can become “technically” weak by engaging in the 
process without been prepared, namely when it has not analyzed thoroughly the material 
facts and the legal arguments of the case, and therefore cannot bargain successfully, 
neither safely predict the outcome of a possible litigation. This technical weakness may 
be also produced by the filing of an inadmissible lawsuit which will definitely be 
dismissed by the court. Additionally, a long delay of the claimant to initiate litigation 
may have already formed the situation and the facts of life for both parties in such a 
way, that a change is probably impossible to the detriment of the claimant. Moreover 
the lack of knowledge about negotiation tactics, the lack of Best Alternative to a 
Negotiated Agreement (BATNA), the inability of expressing one’s needs and wants, 
deprives him/her from exercising his/her rights on equal terms.  
3) A party is also “deemed weak” when it needs to settle the case immediately 
due to urgent economic necessity, being willing to accept a less favourable agreement in 
relation to a court decision, which would indemnify him/her with better terms for the 
loss (s)he has suffered. In this case, the wealthy opponent will try to take advantage of 
the situation by using all handful negotiation tactics of delay, lack of authorization to 
                                                
83 See supra note 32 
84 See supra note 75, p. 199 
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decide for the agreement, denial to decide for trivial issues85 etc. to coerce the poor 
party settle the case with the less profit possible.  
4) When one party cannot afford to finance litigation (lawyer’s expenses, 
discovery process) if mediation fails, and is forced to agree with a proposal that does 
not satisfy his/her interests86.  
5) When a party does not seem to understand the implications of accepting an 
arrangement in case (s)he complies with the terms of the settlement, but refuses to take 
expert advice due to lack of economic resources87.  
 
B) THE ISSUE OF FAMILY ABUSE 
In family cases, power imbalance is usually evidenced with the form of unequal 
allocation of goods and economic power (the husband has a job and gains more money 
than his wife, so he can afford to go on living alone, owns the family house etc.), 
knowledge of negotiation skills, willingness to exercise power and decrease the 
necessary financial means for the rest of the family (wife and children) to live 
separately. All these means, practically, are negotiating advantages in the detriment of 
the female spouse.  
However, the psychological, social and economic models that in previous 
decades used to complicate a divorce procedure for the female spouse seem to have lost 
their significance in modern societies. Wives are no longer expected to live “at the 
shadow” of their ex-husband, being dependent on his financial support, and living in 
social isolation (as examples for avoidance). In most cases they are financially 
independent contributing to the expenses of family life, have knowledge of bargaining 
and are capable of responding efficiently to defend themselves against attempts of 
control. In contemporary societies, they are acknowledged as being “potential 
equals”88. Nowadays divorce is deemed to create economic, emotional and personal 
difficulties that affect both spouses, especially when they have (common) children. It 
involves a transitional period, where instability prevails for a long time until they are 
ready to redefine their roles in society as individuals and go on with their lives again.  
                                                
85 See supra note 66, p. 3 
86 Fiss M. Owen, “Against Settlement”, 93 The Yale Law Journal 1073, volume 93, number 6, May 1984,  
    p. 1076  
87 See supra note 28, p. 73-79.  
88 See supra note 74, p. 4 
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A specific category of family cases are the ones of domestic abuse. Domestic 
abuse can be a pattern of physical, emotional or sexual abuse exercised by the batterer 
upon his victim89. It may include unkind comments that insult or ridicule the victim, 
actions of anger, irony and threat of revenge that intimidate the victim into physical, 
emotional, financial or sexual submission, silence, self-pity, lack of self-respect, 
depression, deprivation of spousal and parental rights, as well as social isolation. It also 
involves exercise of physical violation such as pushing, slapping, choking, punching, 
use of weapons and rape90 that may escalate into homicide. Violence is usually followed 
by promises of repentance and change that the batterer gives the victim, when the latter 
expresses the will to leave the relationship and abandon the batterer in the event this 
behaviour is repeated. Unfortunately it all lasts for a little while, until the abuser finds a 
new opportunity to blame the victim and resort to his usual habits again. In most cases 
family children are also included in the circle of violence, as usually in the perverse 
mind of the batterer everyone gives him motives to get angry once more.  
This relational background of a divorcing couple has provoked a lot of 
scepticism, whether mediation can respond to a power imbalance of this kind on equal 
terms, safeguard the weak party’s rights, and end up in a settlement containing mutually 
acceptable terms that will enable the surviving-spouse go on with his/her life and deter 
the batterer from intimidating the victim or abusing it. The male spouse is usually 
stronger for the same typical reason that apply in family non-violent disputes with the 
difference, that in the majority of family abuse, the male party seems to end up in a 
more favourable position in relation to the one he was before.   
To face these kind of cases, the mediator has to be a professional divorce 
mediator with specific training on divorce cases and abuse issues, and he should 
additionally have long experience to know how to handle the participants, understand 
the underlying issues that maybe neither of them is willing to admit, be able to discern 
the signs of intimidation happening during mediation and estimate the degree of its 
impact to the victim, foresee the implications that a temporary decision might have 
upon the life of the victim and the children, take precautionary measures to verify the 
safety of the surviving-spouse as well as him/herself during mediation. In case the 
                                                
89 Long Martin, “Stopping Domestic Violence – How a Community Can Prevent Spousal Abuse”,  
    University College Dublin, Degree Master of Arts (Mediation and Conflict Resolution),  
   August 2006, p. 11 and 19 
90 See supra note 75, p. 152 
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couple has children, the abuse victim should be provided with sufficient information 
regarding custody awards given to batterers, or awarded by virtue of the “best interests” 
standard, or if a joint custody is possible. An arrangement should include specific rules 
and duties imposed to each parent regarding child custody, communication and 
alimony, in order to avoid possible fighting and exercise of abuse in the future.91  
Practice has shown that not all cases of domestic violence are the same and this 
is the reason why not all of these cases can be resolved by mediation. Luckily or not this 
is a decision that a mediator shall take at the preparation stage with or without the 
assistance of the parties’ counselors. It is a case by case choice and depends on the 
severity of the abuse, the length of time abuse has taken place, the possibility to control 
the abuser behaviour during mediation by ordinary procedural mediation tools (e.g. 
separate sessions) and verbal techniques (reframing), and conduct a quality process 
within the limits of dignity and respect. Mediation is impossible to conduct, and if 
started it should be terminated immediately, unless the abuser admits responsibility for 
exercising violence upon his spouse, not carries a weapon, does not drink or uses drugs 
during mediation, abuses or attempting to abuse by verbal or physical violence the 
spouse-victim or the mediator92, so as to coerce them to abide by his own terms. This 
behaviour is the external result of very well founded beliefs of his personality that 
reflect his own value system towards human kind and needs, and it is unlikely to change 
by submitting the divorce case to a mediator. However, the victim’s will to mediate is 
the primary condition that must be taken into account. Additionally, its capacity to 
participate actively in mediation must be assessed on an individual level. It varies 
depending on her personality; degree of acceptance of the fact that she has so many 
times been deprived of her rights as woman, mother, spouse; severity of abuse; fear for 
retaliation which usually escalates by the time of divorce; financial capacity to afford a 
separate life or litigation in case mediation fails. Research has shown that both men and 
women may be equally perpetrators and victims of domestic abuse93. However, in most 
cases victims are female.  
To ensure a smooth conduct of the mediation process in family violence, some 
of the measures a mediator can take are: the establishment of specific rules for conduct 
in mediation, such as excluding offensive language and actions, interrupting the other 
                                                
91 See supra note 75, p. 199 
92 See supra note 75, p. 195 
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party when he speaks, intimidating or raising voice; ask parties to consent in strictly 
refraining from any physical contact indoors and outside mediation; encourage legal 
representation of the parties; hold only separate sessions; allow the presence of a third 
party (usually a relative or a friend); terminate the process at different times for each 
participant in order to ensure a safe arrival and/or departure of the victim-spouse94. An 
important tool to discourage such behaviour is the agreement that confidentiality will 
not cover intimidating actions or abuse that will be immediately reported to the official 
authorities.  
In the majority of family abuse cases, mediation is the only process the victim 
can afford due to deprivation of financial resources, whether employed or not. Although 
criminal prosecution in some cases functions as deterrence for the continuation of 
abuse, strong representation before courts, including restraining measures and court 
orders, are usually impossible to obtain95. 
Finally, mediator’s ethical dilemmas exist also in family cases of domestic 
abuse, with the difference that, here his choices can prove to be fatal for the victim of 
the abuse. The mediator duties with regard to procedural and substantive fairness are 
exactly the same as in every other mediation; however, the burden of power imbalance 
is huge. The mediator should know exactly what (s)he is doing. Neutrality regarding the 
outcome should be distinguished from the safety of the participants and the quality of 
the procedure96.  
 
 XIII.- CONCLUSION  
The matter of the relation between the weak and the strong party in mediation 
can take wide dimensions. The burden of confronting power imbalance and 
guaranteeing fairness for the parties is entrusted to the mediator who seems to be alone 
in administering their relational conflict. He undoubtedly needs to establish a specific 
strategy depending on the nature of the dispute and the complexity of the issues to 
conduct mediation within a framework of equal treatment and mutual respect. 
Responding to ethical dilemmas practically means managing human relationships. His 
personal beliefs and ethical standards affect his style and reflect on the techniques he 
applies in the process; this is a factor he should be consciously aware of, so as to avoid 
                                                
94 See supra note 75, p. 201 
95 See supra note 75, p. 169 
96 See supra note 75, p. 188  
38 
 
being driven by it during the evolution of the process. Moreover the role of the 
attending lawyers97 is significant for assisting the mediator and upgrade the level of 
procedural and substantial fairness.  
Although ethical-philosophical thinking could be a source of inspiration for 
facing ethical dilemmas, it does not seem to be sufficient to cover challenges in practice. 
Mediation Institutions worldwide98 should co-operate to create an electronic data base 
where practicing mediators, upon their discretion, could record a short summary of 
material facts and ethical issues they faced, along with the choices they made and how 
these affected on the parties and the process. Confidentiality should be respected by all 
means regarding the personal details that could identify the participants.  
Despite the difficulty of the mediator’s role and the worries about preserving 
equality guarantees for the parties involved, mediation has flourished and substituted 
litigation in a wide range of cases. This reality is due to the repeated disappointment of 
the legal community for the inefficiencies of the adversary system, and the result of its 
efforts to invent other procedural means to resolve legal problems in private and flexible 
ways which have proved to be efficient and successful.  
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